Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tari¤ levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse o¤; and may even immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) the core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional e¤ects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have often been exempted from this rule.
Introduction
Throughout the history of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), there have been rounds of negotiations during which member countries have attempted to reduce their trade barriers on each other. However, in several in ‡uential papers, Rose (2004a Rose ( , 2004b has made the provocative argument that despite such e¤orts, there is very little evidence that the GATT/WTO has made a signi…cant contribution in promoting world trade. More speci…cally, in Rose (2004a) , he shows that membership in the GATT/WTO is not associated with enhanced trade, once one takes into account standard factors that help explain international trade ‡ows (such as those captured in a typical gravity equation model). The question then becomes why this might be so. Using more than sixty measures of trade policy, Rose (2004b) argues that this is because trade policies of WTO members do not signi…cantly di¤er from those of non-members. Furthermore, he …nds that a country's trade liberalization signi…cantly lags its entry into GATT and that many countries that were relatively closed at the time of their GATT entry remained so for long periods of time. 1 Evidence regarding early GATT rounds also supports this argument. For example, it is well known that except for the Geneva round of 1947, initial GATT rounds failed to deliver any signi…cant trade liberalization. As Irwin (2002) notes "... after Geneva there was a long period in which relatively little was accomplished. Subsequent negotiating rounds were held at Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950-51) , and Geneva . These negotiations resulted in the accession of more countries to GATT, but further tari¤ reductions were negligible, about 2 percent in each round, on average. The Dillon Round (1960-61) also produced little in terms of tangible results."
For those who believe that the GATT/WTO system has been a major factor in promoting world trade, the …ndings of Rose (2004a and 2004b) are puzzling to say the least. One way to proceed forward is to ask: What, besides trade liberalization, can the WTO system do for world trade? As Rose (2004a) himself suggests, 1 More speci…cally, Rose (2004b) …nds that the openness ratio (i.e. exports plus imports divided by gross domestic product) of a typical accession country …ve years prior to its joining GATT equals 73.1% which does not di¤er signi…cantly from its openness ratio …ve years post accession (which equals 70.4%). In fact, the same is true of all nine measures of trade policy used in his empirical analysis.
the institutional features of the WTO might provide signi…cant bene…ts to its members and the world as a whole. Our argument in this paper is that by requiring member countries to abide by several key rules speci…ed in its various multilateral agreements such as GATT, the WTO has had an important e¤ect on the policy environment under which international trade occurs. While multilateral trade agreements are quite complicated and contain a multitude of clauses, it is widely acknowledged that the most favored nation (MFN) clause is the fundamental idea underlying all such agreements (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001 ). 2 What is MFN? As per Jackson (1997) : "The MFN obligation calls for each contracting party (CP) to grant to every other CP the most favorable treatment that it grants to any other country." In other words, MFN requires that each member's tari¤s on similar products exported to its market by other members be equal.
In our view, useful insights regarding the role of GATT/WTO system in world trade can be achieved by analyzing GATT as a club whose only requirement for membership is that its members grant MFN to each other. Following this view, it is worthwhile to analyze how such a club might arise and what its welfare e¤ects might be. Accordingly, we endogenize the formation of an MFN club in an environment that abstracts from explicit tari¤ negotiations amongst its members. 3 More speci…cally, we address several questions that arise in this context: From an individual country's perspective, what are the costs and bene…ts of joining an MFN club? Are all countries willing to join? Does the formation of such a club raise aggregate world welfare? How does it a¤ect the welfare of members and non-members? To answer these and related questions, we examine two di¤erent games of club formation between four countries engaged in oligopolistic intraindustry trade of the type formulated in Brander and Krugman (1983) . We use this model because it facilitates the analysis of endogenous tari¤s in an environment of asymmetry.
The existence of cost asymmetry in our model generates incentives for tari¤ 2 MFN constitutes the very …rst Article of GATT and occupies a central place in the other major multilateral agreements of the WTO such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 3 It is worth emphasizing that tari¤s are the only means of protection in our model and should be interpreted as a rough measure of market access. This is important because while tari¤s have been substantially reduced over time and some of this progress (and some might say most of it) has been undone by the proliferation of non-tari¤ barriers to international trade. discrimination which in turn creates a meaningful role for MFN. It is well established that in an environment of imperfect competition, tari¤ discrimination is socially harmful when it is biased against low cost exporters (see Gatsios, 1990 , Hwang and Mai, 1991 , Choi, 1995 , Saggi, 2004 , and Saggi and Yildiz, 2005 . 4 It follows then that the desirability of an MFN club from a global welfare perspective depends upon how it alters the global distribution of tari¤s relative to that under tari¤ discrimination. Taking this argument as a starting point, we analyze two di¤erent games of club formation: (i) an open membership (OM) game and (ii) an exclusive membership (EM) game. We allow countries to deviate jointly and derive the coalition proof Nash equilibria of these games. Our approach is related to that of Aghion et. al. (2004) , Yi (1996) , and Burbidge et. al. (1997) all of whom analyze games of coalition formation with externalities. While Aghion et. al. (2004) and Yi (1996) focus on the endogenous formation of trade agreements (under which members impose zero tari¤s on each other), we primarily consider clubs where members exchange MFN status with one another. Later in the paper, we brie ‡y discuss the case of a free trade club.
We …nd that the emergence of an MFN club enhances aggregate world welfare and the larger the club, the more desirable it is from a welfare perspective. It is noteworthy that this result obtains even though the emergence of an MFN club does not a¤ect average tari¤ levels across countries in our model. This implies that adoption of the central WTO rule (i.e. MFN) by its members is of value even when it is not accompanied by any trade liberalization. Furthermore, we show that among clubs that have the same number of members, those that include low cost countries are more desirable because such countries face relatively higher tari¤s under discrimination. Thus, the fact that most of the initial GATT members were advanced industrialized countries was probably a good thing.
Given that there exist myriad di¤erences across countries, it is quite unlikely that a non-discrimination requirement such as MFN a¤ects all countries in a similar fashion (even as it increases aggregate welfare). We …nd that the desirability of an MFN club from a country's perspective depends upon how its production 4 Important contributions to the literature on MFN that are not based on the oligopoly trade model include: Staiger (1999 and 2004) , Caplin and Krishna (1988) , Ederington and McCalman (2003) , Ludema (1991) , Maggi (1999) , McCalman (2002) , and Takemori (1994) . See Horn and Mavroidis (2001) for a survey. cost relative to others. In general, receiving MFN from others is of greater value to countries that have relatively lower costs of production. In fact, we argue that e¤ect that an MFN club has on higher cost countries in our model can shed light on the actual experience of developing countries with the multilateral trading system. More speci…cally, it is noteworthy that developing country members of the WTO have been granted Special and Di¤erential (S&D) treatment ever since the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) came into existence in the 1970s. Under S&D treatment, many developing countries receive preferential tari¤s from major industrialized countries. 5 As per Oyejide (2002) : "S&D provisions are meant to grant developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) more favorable access to the markets of industrial countries..." and that the existence of such provisions in the GATT/WTO system re ‡ects the idea that "...because of disparities in economic situation and capacities, there are signi…cant di¤erences in the bene…ts (italics added) that countries reap from the global trading system."Thus, WTO's S&D provisions allow developing countries to receive better-than-MFN treatment from industrialized countries. Our results suggest that such exceptions to MFN might have been necessary to undo some of the adverse distributional e¤ects created by the formation of an MFN club. 6 An intriguing result of our model is that a high cost country can voluntarily end up joining an MFN club even though its welfare as a member is lower than that under tari¤ discrimination. Such a result obtains because the fate of a high cost country as a non-member can be even worse than that as a member. In fact, we show that a three country club can be an equilibrium even when the two higher cost members are worse o¤ relative to discrimination -each would be better o¤ if neither were to join but has an incentive to join if the other does not. This result accords well with the widespread sense of ambivalence among developing country members of the WTO regarding their status in the organization as well as the bene…ts that the multilateral trading system confers upon them (see Tussie and Lengyel, 2002) . 5 A second dimension of S&D treatment was that developing countries were often exempt from certain multilateral rules and disciplines. Developments in the Uruguay Round basically ensured that this dimension of S&D treatment will eventually be phased out. 6 It is worth noting here that Rose (2004a) …nds that the GSP had a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on promoting trade even though the WTO as a whole did not. Thus, the GSP actually mattered and was not merely a super…cial gesture on the part of industrialized countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the oligopoly model of international trade under tari¤ discrimination and MFN while section 3 discusses the e¤ects of di¤erent types of MFN clubs (taking their existence as a given). Sections 4 and 5 analyze the open membership and the exclusive membership games to study two di¤erent ways of endogenizing an MFN club. Section 6 consider the formation of an MFN club whose members must undertake some trade liberalization trade with respect to each other. Section 7 concludes while section 8 constitutes the appendix. All proofs not provided in the text are in the appendix.
Tari¤s in the oligopoly trade model
We begin with a brief description of the underlying trade model and then analyze two di¤erent games that endogenize the formation of an MFN club. There are four countries indexed by i = a; b; c; or d and two goods: x and y. Consumer preferences over the two goods are quasi-linear: U (x; y) = u(x) + y where the numeraire good y is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale technology. Good x is produced by a monopolist in each country. We refer to country i's monopolist as …rm i. The marginal cost of production of …rm i is given by i , where d c b a = 0. Firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition) and make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market (i.e. markets are segmented). Firm j faces a speci…c tari¤ t ji when exporting to country i, where t ii = 0 for all i.
0 is a 4 1 dimensional vector. Denote the tari¤ schedules of all countries other than i by t i and the matrix of all countries trade policies by t where t (t a ....t d ). Let x i = P j x ji , where j = a; b; c; or d, denote the total output of good x sold in country i and let x i = x i x ii denote country i's total imports of good x.
Whether or not an MFN club exists, all countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules to maximize their own welfare. As is well known, under linear costs and market segmentation, a country's optimal tari¤ schedule is independent of the tari¤ schedules of other countries. Lack of interdependence of tari¤s is clearly a limitation of our model but one that greatly simpli…es the analysis. In the absence of linearity or market segmentation, the model would not have this feature. However, most related models make similar assumptions and as Staiger (1995) has noted, it is not clear whether tari¤s ought to be treated as strategic substitutes or complements.
From hereon, the dependence of country i's domestic surplus S i (t i ) (de…ned in equation 2.1 as the sum of consumer surplus and own …rm's pro…ts derived from the local market) on the tari¤s of other countries is ignored. If country i practices tari¤ discrimination toward all other countries, it solves:
where CS i denotes consumer surplus in country i and is given by
ii (t i ) denotes the pro…t function of …rm i in its own market and P j6 =i ij (t j ) denotes its pro…t function for exports where
and T R i (t i ) denotes country i's total tari¤ revenue:
The welfare function in (2.1) includes export pro…ts P j6 =i ij (t j ) because they contribute to domestic welfare (even though market segmentation implies that export pro…ts are independent of a country's own tari¤s).
Let t i denote country i's optimal discriminatory tari¤ schedule:
If country i practices MFN toward all others, it imposes a non-discriminatory tari¤ (say t i ) on all foreign exporters and solves:
Let t M i denote country i's optimal MFN tari¤. Before analyzing club formation, we quickly note two results that have been established in the existing literature on MFN:
An immediate corollary of Result 1 in our context is that the highest cost country ( i.e. d) has nothing to gain from joining an MFN club since it faces lower tari¤s under discrimination. Result 2 says that the formation of an MFN club does not alter its total protection T i (or average tari¤s). Note that in our model, the total volume of a country's imports of good x depends only upon its total protection T i (de…ned above) and not on the distribution of its tari¤s.
We now describe the underlying trade-o¤s involved in joining an MFN club from the perspective of each country. Furthermore, to make analytical progress on the various questions of interest, we assume that u(x) is quadratic so that demand for good x is linear: p = q:
How an MFN club a¤ects global tari¤s
In this section, we examine how di¤erent types of clubs a¤ect the tari¤s of members and non-member countries. As per the de…nition of MFN, we require that each member of an MFN club treat all other members in a non-discriminatory fashion and no worse than non-members. Note that since country d actually faces higher tari¤s under MFN than it does under discrimination, it has nothing to gain from being granted MFN and clubs including country d need not be examined.
Protection levels and tari¤ concessions
In this section, we report some preliminary results that are instrumental for our core analysis (contained in sections 4 and 5). While these results are quite closely linked to the existing literature on MFN under oligopoly, they have not been formally derived or discussed there. The variation of total tari¤ protection across countries is as follows:
The total tari¤ protection of country i (under tari¤ discrimination or any MFN club) is decreasing in its own cost:
The intuition for this result has to do with the fact that tari¤s are used to extract rents in the oligopoly model: since demand is symmetric across countries, any given reduction in imports does roughly equal harm to consumer welfare in all countries whereas it results in a greater increase in local pro…ts of domestic …rms in lower cost countries (because they enjoy higher mark-ups).
How does an MFN club alter tari¤s relative to the status quo? Let t ij (m) denote the tari¤ concession received by country i from country j in the MFN club m:
where hf gi denotes the status quo and m = hfabcgi, hfabgi ; hfacgi, or hfbcgi.
The …rst point to emphasize is that whether or not a member actually receives tari¤ concessions (i.e. t ij (m) > 0) from other members depends upon the distribution of production costs across countries. The following is shown in the appendix:
In any MFN club m, the lowest cost member receives tari¤ concessions from all other members. In general, the higher the cost of a member, the less likely it is that it receives tari¤ concessions from other members.
Thus, the exchange of MFN among countries does not always result in all members granting tari¤ concessions to each other. The proof of Lemma 2 provides conditions under which countries other than a also receive tari¤ concessions when they join an MFN club. To get some intuition for Lemma 2, suppose hfabcgi were the MFN club and consider the tari¤s faced by each country relative to hf gi. Recall from Result 1 that country a faces the highest tari¤s under hf gi. Under hfabcgi, country a obtains MFN status from countries b and c and therefore receives tari¤ concessions from both of them. Similarly, from country a's perspective, country b is its most e¢ cient partner and so country b must receive a tari¤ concession from country a when hfabcgi obtains. But does country b necessarily receive a tari¤ concession from country c? The answer is no. From country c's perspective, country a is the most e¢ cient exporter and it is the one that necessarily receives a tari¤ concession. Whether country b also receives a tari¤ concession from country c depends upon the distribution of production costswhen country b's cost is lower than the average of countries a and d, it receives a tari¤ concession from country c or else it su¤ers a tari¤ increase from country c.
The second key point to establish is that the magnitude of tari¤ concessions involved in an MFN club are asymmetric in nature:
Lemma 3: In any MFN club m, the tari¤ concession member i receives from member j is larger than the tari¤ concession it grants to member j i¤ its own production cost is relatively lower: t ij (m) t ji (m) i¤ i j : Since the lowest cost country faces the highest tari¤s under hf gi, the formation of an MFN club forces other members to substantially reduce their tari¤s on country a. Furthermore, recall that the total protection of a country decreases with own cost (Lemma 1). Also, the least cost and the highest cost countries (i.e. a and d) do not have as strong an incentive to tari¤ discriminate as the intermediate countries (i.e. b and c) who are served by foreign exporters with bigger cost di¤erentials. Therefore, country a's cost of joining the club is not as high as that of others due to three reasons: (i) it is forced to lower its tari¤s less than higher cost countries; (ii) the tari¤ reductions it grants to others apply to a smaller volume of imports due to its higher total protection T i and (iii) it does not su¤er as much as intermediate countries from not being able to tari¤ discriminate.
Costs and bene…ts of joining an MFN club
Due to strategic independence of tari¤s and segmentation of markets, the trade-o¤ underlying a country's decision to join an MFN club is quite transparent: the cost of membership is the loss in domestic surplus that results from not being able to tari¤ discriminate whereas the bene…t is the (potential) increase in export pro…ts generated by the tari¤ concessions received from other club members. Given Result 2, MFN adoption only lowers the tari¤ revenue collected by a country without a¤ecting its domestic surplus in other ways. Of course, the extent of revenue reduction depends upon who else joins the club.
Let T R i (m) measure the reduction in country i's tari¤ revenue when it joins the MFN club m where m = hfabcgi, hfabgi ; hfacgi, or hfbcgi. We have:
The bene…t to country i of joining club m is measured by the total increase in its export pro…ts that results from any tari¤ concessions that accompany membership:
Our …rst major result describes how the cost of membership depends upon the distribution of production costs across countries and the nature of the MFN club:
Proposition 1: For any two member MFN club, the loss in tari¤ revenue relative to hf gi is larger for the higher cost member: T R j (m)
T R i (m) i¤ i j where m = hfabgi ; hfacgi, or hfbcgi. In hfabcgi, the loss in tari¤ revenue of the lowest cost member is the smallest:
The explanation for why the tari¤ revenue loss of countries b and c cannot be ranked unambiguously has to do with the con ‡ict between the three e¤ects described at the end of section 3.1. While country b loses relatively more from not being able to tari¤ discriminate, country c reduces its tari¤s to a greater degree while also facing a larger volume of imports. How does a country rank two potential partners from the perspective of loss in own tari¤ revenue? Lemma 4: From member i's perspective, a two country club with member j implies a larger loss in tari¤ revenue than a club with member k i¤ member j is relatively lower cost than member k:
The reason for this result is two-fold: not only does country i grant a larger tari¤ concession to country j under hfijgi than it grants country k under hfikgi (because j k ), the larger concession also applies to a larger volume of imports since x ji (ij) > x ki (ik):
Consider now the bene…ts received from di¤erent potential club partners from the perspective of a country: Lemma 5: From member i's perspective, a club with member j yields a larger tari¤ concession from its partner than does a club with member k i¤ member j is relatively lower cost than member k:
However, a larger tari¤ concession from country j does not necessarily translate into a larger increase in total export pro…ts for country i since its volume of exports also vary across its trading partners. In fact, from Lemma 1 and the second part of Result 1, we know that x ik (ik) x ij (ij) i¤ j k -i.e. country i exports more to a relatively higher cost club partner. Since the volume e¤ect counteracts the tari¤ concession e¤ect, country i's bene…t of club hfijgi can be either higher or lower than the bene…t of club hfikgi. On the other hand, the asymmetric nature of tari¤ concessions involved in an MFN club give us a clear result regarding the distribution of gains that across its members since lemmas 2 and 3 immediately imply:
Proposition 2: For any MFN club m, the increase in export pro…ts enjoyed by member i is higher than the corresponding increase for member j i¤ member i is relatively lower cost than member j:
An immediate implication of Propositions 1 and 2 is that country a has the strongest incentive to join an MFN club: it su¤ers the lowest decline in tari¤ revenue and enjoys the highest increase in export pro…ts. In fact, it would like to form an MFN club with whoever else is willing to do so. The following proposition compares various MFN clubs from each country's perspective:
Proposition 3: Let i denote strict preference and i indi¤erence for country i. The following hold with respect to individual country rankings of the various MFN clubs: (i) country a: hfabcgi a (hfacgi ; hfabgi) a hf gi a hfbcgi; (ii) country b: hfbcgi b b hfacgi and (iii) country c: hfbcgi c hfacgi. Part (i) of proposition 3 follows from Lemmas 2 and 3: country a receives relatively large tari¤ concessions from all others that join and therefore likes the biggest MFN club the best. Perhaps more intriguing is the fact that country a does not have an unambiguous preference between the clubs hfacgi and hfabgi. Why is this so? The answer is contained in Lemmas 4 and 5: while country a receives a bigger tari¤ concession from country b under hfabgi than it does from country c under hfacgi, it also has to grant country b a bigger concession relative to what it has to grant country c. Finally, why is country a indi¤erent between hfbcgi and hf gi? Result 2 says that the total protection of each member does not change relative to hf gi when hfbcgi is formed. Since country a has the lowest production cost, country b imposes its optimal discriminatory tari¤ on it while imposing the average of its optimal discriminatory tari¤s on the other two countries. Exactly an analogous argument applies to country c's tari¤ schedule under hfbcgi. As a result, the sum total of tari¤ included marginal costs of rival exporters faced by country a under hfbcgi is the same as that under hf gi. Since its own domestic surplus does not change due to the formation of hfbcgi, country a is strictly indi¤erent between hf gi and hfbcgi.
While a general ranking of country b's preferences among the various clubs is not possible, it turns out that for most parameter values it prefers hfbcgi to hfabgi. Only when country b itself is relatively low cost does it …nd hfabgi more attractive than hfbcgi. Country c, on the other hand, always prefers hfbcgi to hfacgi. As is clear from Lemma 2, as the production cost of a country increases, its incentive to exchange MFN with the lowest cost country declines.
How are non-members a¤ected by the formation of an MFN club? The answer here is clear -non-members are (weakly) worse o¤ relative to tari¤ discrimination since tari¤s of members on non-members are never lower than those under discrimination whereas their tari¤s on other members are no higher than those on non-members. Note that under hfabcgi country c can face higher tari¤s than that under hf gi and still remain in the club since the tari¤s it faces under hfabgi would be still higher.
It is easy to show that the bigger the MFN club, the higher is aggregate world welfare (de…ned as the sum of the welfare of individual countries). This implies that the most desirable MFN club -i.e. hfabcdgi -does not arise because country d is always better o¤ as a non-member. Of the remaining clubs, hfabcgi is clearly the next best option. But what about clubs hfabgi, hfacgi, and hfbcgi? Here, the result is as follows:
Proposition 4: Among MFN clubs with only two members, hfabgi yields the highest aggregate world welfare while hfbcgi yields the lowest.
The inclusion of country a in an MFN club is of vital importance for world welfare because the large tari¤ reductions it receives in other markets help allocate more of the world's production to the lowest cost location. Similarly, since country b is lower cost than c, its inclusion in an MFN club is relatively more important. As a result, hfabgi is welfare-preferred to hfacgi. The club hfbcgi excludes the lowest cost producer who ends up facing the same tari¤s as it does under hf gi and is therefore of least value (although it is still preferable to hf gi because it allocates output in favor of countries b and c at the expense of country d).
Having described how various types of MFN clubs a¤ect tari¤s and welfare, we are now ready to endogenize club formation.
An open membership MFN club
In this section, we analyze an open membership (OM) game that captures the following intuitive scenario that can be viewed as the 'beginning of GATT'. Imagine that there is a room (call it the MFN club) upon entering which a country has to grant MFN to all those that have entered as well (in case it decides to stay in the club). Each country is free to enter or leave the club. Countries that choose not to enter practice tari¤ discrimination and do not receive MFN status from those inside the club. An MFN club obtains in equilibrium if several countries enter the room and decide to stay.
The above game is formalized as follows. In the …rst stage, countries simultaneously decide whether or not to adopt MFN with respect to their tari¤ schedules. Each country makes an announcement: it either commits to MFN or not. After countries make their announcements, each country that commits to MFN grants MFN status to all others countries that make same commitment. Next, given their policy regimes, all countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules. Finally, …rms choose their output levels.
It is easy to see that the OM game admits multiple (sub-game perfect) Nash equilibria -no country would stay in the MFN club as a singleton. As a result, status quo is a Nash equilibrium of the OM game but it is not a very interesting one. Furthermore, it seems desirable to allow countries to form coalitions and deviate jointly from any outcome. When such deviations are possible, a more appropriate equilibrium concept is that of a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if it is immune to credible or self-enforcing coalitional deviations. 8 However, in the OM game, under minor conditions all Nash equilibria turn out to be coalition-proof (shown in the appendix). The reason for this is as follows. It is meaningful to examine coalitional deviations only when hfabcgi emerges as the club. Furthermore, the only deviation to consider from hfabcgi is the joint deviation of countries b and c to hf gi. 9 However, under minor conditions, this deviation is not credible since each deviating country wants to further deviate to form a club with country a alone. This argument is easy to see from Figure 1 which illustrates equilibrium MFN clubs in the OM game in the ( b , c ) space.
- Figure 1 here - 8 See Bernheim and Whinston (1987a and 1987b) for further details. 9 Country a is free to enter the club and will always do so. Thus, when acting jointly, countries b and c can only leave the club together (i.e. cannot form a club by themselves). By contrast, under the exclusive membership game analyzed below, countries b and c have the ability to exclude country a from the club and coalitional deviations are more interesting there.
In Figure 1 , only the region above the 45 degree line is relevant since c b .
10 By using indi¤erence conditions for all countries, the parameter space can be partitioned into regions over which various clubs obtain in equilibrium. For example, along the curve c:ac = country c is indi¤erent between clubs hfacgi and hf gi; below the curve it prefers hfacgi to hf gi whereas the opposite is true above it. All other indi¤erence curves are labelled similarly -the identity of a country is followed by the regimes among which it is indi¤erent along a particular indi¤erence curve. The intuition for why indi¤erence curves slope upwards is that granting MFN to an e¢ cient country is costly in terms of foregone tari¤ revenue whereas receiving MFN is attractive precisely when own cost is low. For example, for country c to remain indi¤erent between being part of a club versus being outside, an increase in its own cost has to be matched by an increase in the cost of country b.
Several important conclusions emerge from Figure 1 : (i) Over much of the parameter space, hfabcgi and hfabgi emerge as MFN clubs. In other words, an equilibrium MFN club is more likely to have the lower cost countries as its members; (ii) hfabcgi emerges when all countries have relatively similar (and low) costs of production; (iii) when both countries b and c have high costs, no one wants to join country a in an MFN club and hf gi ends up as the equilibrium; (iv) there is a small region right above region B in which both hfabgi and hfacgi are equilibria. Note that this region is close to the 45 degree line -i.e. when countries b and c have very similar costs, only one of them ends up as a member; and (v) the region over which hfabcgi obtains club can be divided into three sub-regions: A, B, and C. In sub-region C, all countries prefer hfabcgi to hf gi. However, this is not the case in the other two sub-regions. In sub-region B, country b prefers hf gi to hfabcgi but opts to join the club because it is worse o¤ under hfacgi than it is under hf gi. Furthermore, in both sub-regions A and B, country c prefers hf gi to hfabcgi but it ends up in the club because its welfare as member of hfabcgi is higher than that under hfabgi as a non-member. The last result deserves emphasis:
Proposition 5: The MFN club hfabcgi can arise in equilibrium even though its relatively high cost members (i.e. countries b and c) are worse o¤ relative to hf gi. Furthermore, if country b is worse o¤ under hfabcgi then country c must also be worse o¤.
Proposition 5 obtains because a country can end up joining an MFN club not because it prefers joining the club to hf gi but rather because being a nonmember is worse than being a member. But can't countries b and c prevent such an outcome by jointly deviating to hf gi as a coalition? The answer to this question turns out to be no. If they were to deviate to hf gi together, then each would want to further deviate from that to form an MFN club with country a alone. As a result, the coalitional deviation of countries b and c to hf gi is not credible.
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The cost asymmetry between countries is crucial in delivering proposition 5. This result can perhaps shed some light on the widespread sense of dissatisfaction among the WTO's developing country members. Proposition 5 indicates that it is the higher cost countries that can end up being reluctant members of an MFN club and the higher a country's cost, the more likely it is that it loses as a member relative to hf gi.
An exclusive membership MFN club
In the …rst stage of the exclusive membership (EM) game, each country makes an announcement regarding the list of potential MFN club members. For example, country a's strategy set is S a = fhf gi ; hfabgi ; hfacgi ; hfabcgig. 13 In the next stage, an MFN club is formed by those that make the same announcement. If no announcements match, status quo hf gi prevails.
In the EM game, whenever a country unilaterally deviates from a three country MFN club, the other two countries remain within the club (as in Hart and Kurz, 1983) . Also, any unilateral deviation from a two country club yields the status quo hf gi. Just like the OM game, hf gi is a Nash equilibrium of the EM game for all parameter values. However, unlike the OM game, Nash equilibria of the EM game are much less likely to be coalition-proof. We illustrate this below by two examples. Let w i (m) denote the di¤erence between country i's welfare under club m and status quo hf gi:
Example 1: Suppose a = 0; b = 0:2; c = 0:6; d = 1;and = 20. In Table 1 , row 1 shows that the formation of hfabgi increases welfare of member countries and that of the world as a whole whereas it lowers the welfare of non-members. It is easy to verify that in Table 2 , there are three Nash equilibria (in addition to hf gi) : hfabgi,hfacgi,hfbcgi. The club hfabcgi fails to be a Nash equilibrium because country c is better o¤ under hf gi and would unilaterally deviate from hfabcgi to leave the club. Of the three Nash equilibria, only hfbcgi is coalition-proof -this is indicated in Table 1 by the superscript * on the payo¤s of club members. For example, hfacgi is not coalition-proof because countries b and c can raise their individual welfare levels by jointly deviating to hfbcgi. Furthermore, this joint deviation is credible because neither country has a unilateral incentive to further deviate from hfbcgi. Similar arguments can establish hfabgi and hf gi are also not coalition-proof.
Example 2: Now suppose a = 0; b = 0:2; c = 0:4; d = 1, and = 20. Here, all parameters are the same as that in example 1 except that c is lower. Now hfabgi ; hfacgi ; hfbcgi ; hfabcgi are all Nash equilibria but only hfabcgi and hfbcgi are coalition-proof -as is indicated in Table 2 by the superscript * on the payo¤s of club members. Since country c's cost is now relatively lower compared to Example 1, it is a more willing participant in MFN clubs. To see, for example, as to why hfabgi fails to be coalition-proof, simply note that countries b and c can jointly deviate to hfbcgi and improve their welfare. Figure 2 illustrates Nash equilibria of the EM game while coalition-proof Nash equilibria are shown in Figure 3 .
- Figure 2 hereAs is clear from Figure 2 , multiplicity of Nash equilibria obtains for almost all feasible parameter values. For example, in sub-region A, hfabcgi, hfabgi, hfacgi, and hfbcgi are all Nash equilibria. Such multiplicity makes it imperative to focus on coalition-proof Nash equilibria (see Figure 3 below ). The parameter space over which hfabcgi is coalition-proof under the EM game is much smaller than the space over which it is a Nash equilibrium.
The club hfbcgi is coalition-proof over a large parameter space in the EM game whereas it is never coalition-proof in the OM game. This …nding is of particular interest because hfbcgi is the least desirable MFN club from the viewpoint of world welfare. Why is hfbcgi coalition-proof for such a large range of parameter values in the EM game? This is because countries b and c bene…t substantially from the exclusion of country a to whom they have to grant large tari¤ concessions as a member (see section 3). To gain more insight into this result, …x country b's cost at a low level (say close to zero) and consider moving vertically in Figure 3 plotted in the ( b , c ) space. Near the origin, where each country's cost is small, hfabcgi is the equilibrium. Here, no country has an incentive to exclude any other country from the club since everyone is essentially low cost. As country c's cost increases, it has an incentive to exclude country a whereas country b does not. Hence, both hfbcgi and hfabcgi are equilibrium MFN clubs. A further increase in country c's cost makes hfbcgi the only equilibrium -when country c's cost is really high, country b has a strong incentive to tari¤ discriminate between a and c (so that it wants to keep country a out of the club) and its tari¤ on country c is quite low (making hfbcgi attractive to country c). And …nally, when country c's cost is almost equal to that of country d, the club hfabgi emerges as the equilibrium since country c does not gain much from being granted MFN by other countries (i.e. under hf gi it faces fairly low tari¤s).
The most desirable MFN club (i.e. hfabcgi) is coalition-proof over a smaller region in the EM game relative to the OM game. As noted above, the ability to exclude country a is exercised by countries b and c to keep high tari¤s on country a. In this respect, the EM game gives a worse outcome than the OM game.
The club hfacgi is never coalition-proof under the EM game since countries b and c have an incentive to jointly deviate to hfbcgi in order to exclude country a.
Ceteris paribus, does the OM game yield outcomes that always dominate those yielded by the EM game? The answer to this question is in the a¢ rmative except when both countries b and c have relatively high costs (i.e. there costs are close to that of country d). Under such a world of one low cost and several high cost countries, no country wants to form a club with country a in the OM game thereby yielding hf gi as the equilibrium whereas countries b and c want to form hfbcgi under the EM game since they can exclude country a from the club. While hfbcgi is the least desirable MFN club, it still yields higher world welfare than hf gi.
Furthermore, compared to the OM game, it is much less likely that an MFN club immiserizes its higher cost members relative to tari¤ discrimination. More speci…cally, in the EM game, country b is never worse o¤ as a club member whereas country c is worse o¤ over a much smaller region relative to the OM game (compare region A in …gures 1 and 3).
Trade liberalization
The bulk of our analysis assumes that member countries of an MFN club do not undertake any explicit trade liberalization. In fact, in our model, any trade liberalization that occurs within the club is purely incidental to MFN adoption. As argued in the Introduction of the paper, this is a reasonable approach to analyzing GATT. Nevertheless, it is worth examining a situation where members of an MFN club also undertake trade liberalization towards one another.
Suppose membership of an MFN club requires that members not only adopt MFN but also use a tari¤ lower than their optimal MFN tari¤. More speci…cally, in club m, member country i's tari¤ must equal t i (m) where measures the degree of trade liberalization required for membership and 0 1. Clearly, when = 0 we are in the case of a free trade club and when = 1 the club is purely an MFN one. As might be expected, the analysis under partial trade liberalization (i.e. 0 < < 1) is signi…cantly more complicated than the polar cases of = 0 or = 1. This is because the level of the tari¤ reductions undertaken by a country depend not only on the distribution of costs across countries but also on the identity of club members. Furthermore, each country has to take this into account when choosing whether or not to enter the club in the OM game and which club to announce in the EM game. As a result, it proves instructive to consider two special cases: = 0 and = 0:8. When = 0, club members practice free trade and this case is of obvious interest. The motivation for picking = 0:8 is that the …rst GATT round involved a tari¤ reduction of 20% on an MFN basis. When = 0 our OM game becomes analogous to the game analyzed by Yi (1996) with two important di¤erences. First, Yi (1996) studies a customs union whereas we consider a free trade club. Second, unlike us, he assumes that countries are symmetric with respect to their production costs. Figure 4 illustrates coalition proof Nash equilibria of the OM game for = 0.
- Figure 4 hereAs is clear from Figure 4 , trade liberalization indeed matters since global free trade hfabcdgi can now emerge as an equilibrium. As might be expected, when club members practice free trade, membership becomes more desirable to all countries. However, global free trade hfabcdgi obtains only when the higher cost countries are relatively symmetric in terms of their production costs (i.e. northeast corner of Figure 4 ). For example, when country d is much higher cost than others (i.e. southwest corner of Figure 4) , it opts to stay out and hfabcgi obtains in equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast to Yi (1996) where, in equilibrium, all countries end up joining the customs union. Thus, our results imply that even if GATT membership were to provide a country with immediate free access to markets of other member countries (in return for providing such access itself), the very fact that such liberalization occurs on an MFN basis is enough to make membership unattractive to some countries.
In our view, the fact that country d might prefer to stay out of a free trade club strengthens the argument that provisions other than MFN might indeed be necessary to encourage developing countries to participate in the multilateral trading system. But a subtle point is worth stressing here: even when country d stays out of the free trade club, it is better o¤ relative to tari¤ discrimination. By contrast, in the absence of trade liberalization non-members are always made worse o¤ by the formation of an MFN club. Why is this not true of a free trade club? The reason is that when member countries eliminate tari¤s on each other, they also lower them on country d (i.e. there is tari¤ complementarity). As a result, country d can partially free ride on trade liberalization that occurs among others while retaining the right to tari¤ discriminate itself. Why don't other countries have an incentive to do the same? This is because the welfare gain of membership is higher for relatively e¢ cient producers -recall from Result 1 that optimal discriminatory tari¤s are biased against lower cost producers. Thus, those that have lower costs stand to gain more from membership and the temptation to free ride on the liberalization of others is not strong enough for them to remain outside the free trade club.
We now brie ‡y discuss the case of = 0:8. Here, all countries joining an MFN club undertake a 20% cut in their optimal MFN tari¤s (which of course depend upon who else is in the club). Rather than provide an exhaustive and repetitive analysis we brie ‡y note our main conclusions. Table 3 shows equilibrium outcomes for the case of = 0:8 for the same parameter values as the ones used to construct Table 2 (i.e. = 20; b = :2, c = :4) where = 1. In Table 3 , the superscript ** indicates that hfabcgi is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium of both games whereas the superscript * indicates that hfbcdgi is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium of only the EM game.
14 As is clear from Table 3 , when club members reduce their MFN tari¤s by 20% country d is not willing to join the club if country a is also a member since it has an incentive to deviate from hfabcdgi to hfabcgi. Nevertheless, a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 indicates that country d is willing to form a club with countries b and c when = 0:8 whereas it is not willing to do so when = 1. Thus, trade liberalization does increase the willingness of country d to be a club member to some degree. Note also that countries b and c are actually better o¤ under hfabcdgi relative to hfbcdgi but country d prevents this outcome. Finally, just as in the case of a free trade club, membership does not immiserize any country in the OM game when it is accompanied by a 20% reduction in MFN tari¤s by all members (as evidenced by the lack of any negative numbers in Table  3 ). 
Conclusion
This paper analyzes two related games of club formation in order to gain insight into the emergence of various types of MFN clubs and to examine the welfare consequences of such clubs. The underlying trade model is one of oligopolistic intraindustry trade between four countries that are asymmetric with respect to production costs. This simple structure is su¢ cient to yield a basis for tari¤ discrimination on the part of individual countries whose tari¤ policies are constrained upon the adoption of an MFN clause. We …nd that the formation of any MFN club increases world welfare even though no such club has an a¤ect on average tari¤ levels. This implies that WTO rules have value even if rounds of negotiations between WTO members fail to deliver signi…cant trade liberalization. Given the …ndings of Rose (2004a and 2004b) , this result is reassuring for those who think that the WTO has a useful role to play in the arena of international trade. However, one cannot immediately jump from this conclusion to the argument that membership in an MFN club necessarily makes all participating countries better o¤. In particular, high cost members of the club can lose relative to the status quo even though membership is entirely voluntary. The insight behind this result is that a country may be induced to join a club because being a non-member is worse than being a member. Of course, if transfers (or issue linkages) are possible between countries, such an outcome can be avoided since aggregate world welfare is necessarily increased from any type of MFN club. Similarly, trade liberalization amongst club members can also make this outcome unlikely.
Those that do not join the club are necessarily worse o¤ relative to the status quo and they choose remain outside either because membership further immiserizes them or because they are simply excluded by others (as in the exclusive membership game). In the model, the country with the highest production cost never joins an MFN club that involves no explicit trade liberalization and it is always better o¤ in a world where no such club exists. This result might shed some light on the Special and Di¤erential (S&D) treatment accorded to developing country members of the WTO under which they receive better than MFN treatment under GATT. The model suggests that absence such treatment, many developing countries may prefer to remain outside the GATT/WTO. Since aggregate world welfare is increasing in the size of the MFN club, S&D provisions might have generated some indirect bene…ts for the world as a whole (the costs of such distortionary policies notwithstanding).
While our model provides some interesting insights, it does so fairly speci…c assumptions. In our view, there are at least two directions in which future research is needed. First, an equilibrium theory of an MFN club in a partial equilibrium model such as ours can only take us so far. A general equilibrium approach such as (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999 ) to this issue is much needed. Second, we adopt a welfare-maximizing framework and ignore political economy considerations. The introduction of such considerations in our model might require modi…cations of some our results.
Appendix

Derivation of optimal tari¤s
Under tari¤ discrimination, country i solves
where
Solving the above problem yields
Under MFN toward all countries, country i solves
which gives:
Next we show how optimal tari¤s under various MFN clubs are derived. We divide the parameter space into 4 sub-regions:
As an example consider country a's tari¤ problem under hfabgi :
Solving the above problem yields: 
Tari¤s under hfacgi are calculated similarly.
Lemma 1
Total tari¤ protection by country i is:
From Result 2, T i under any MFN club is the same as that under hf gi. Direct computations show that T i T k i¤ i k .
Lemma 2
It is straightforward that
Similar conclusions can be drawn about tari¤s of countries b and c. We have: The analysis under hfacgi is analogous to that of hfabgi with the roles of countries b and c reversed. However, we only need to consider two cases: (i) 2 b < d and (ii) 2 b > d . Under both cases, member countries receive concessions from each other. Under case (i), tari¤s on country b are the same as that under hf gi whereas under case (ii), it su¤ers a tari¤ increase in c's market with the tari¤ in a's market staying the same as that under hf gi. Finally, under hfbcgi members receive concessions from each other whereas non-members face the same tari¤s as that under hf gi.
Lemma 3
Consider hfabgi. We have: Finally note that t cb t ca = 0.
Equilibria of the OM game
First note that the only Nash equilibrium from which coalitional deviations need to be examined is hfabcgi. To see why, imagine any two country club such as hfabgi that is a Nash equilibrium. If hfabgi is a Nash equilibrium, by de…nition, no single country would deviate to hf gi. The deviation of both to hf gi is not credible since country a loses from such a deviation and would not agree to it. By similar arguments, any two country club that is a Nash equilibrium would also be coalition-proof.
Now consider hfabcgi as a Nash equilibrium. For hfabcgi to be coalition-proof when it is Nash, we need to only ask whether a deviation by countries b and c to hf gi is credible-country a does not ever gain from leaving the club. It turns out that, under conditions speci…ed below, if countries b and c deviate to hf gi then at least one of them wants to further deviate to form a club with country a. As a result, their original deviation to hf gi is not credible. As a result, if hfabcgi is Nash then it is also coalition-proof if (i) if w b (abc) w b (ac) then w b (ab ) w b ( ); and (ii) if w c (abc) w c (ab) then w c (ac) w c ( ). These conditions are minor and are satis…ed for the entire parameter space over which Figures 1-4 have been constructed.
Proposition 3
This result follows from direct calculations. As an example, consider country c's preferences. We have: 
